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LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE

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Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore  
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RAILROAD COMPANY

TO

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

IN REFERENCE TO

IMPROVED FACILITIES OF TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN  
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON,

TOGETHER WITH SOME

OTHER DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO THE SAME SUBJECT, AND

LETTERS AND PAPERS

SHOWING THE NATURE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED THE GOVERNMENT  
BY THE AFORESAID RAILROAD AT THE BREAKING OUT  
OF THE REBELLION.



WASHINGTON :  
HENRY POLKINHORN, PRINTER.  
1862.



OFFICE PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND  
BALTIMORE RAILROAD COMPANY,  
PHILADELPHIA, *March 10, 1862.*

To the Honorable EDWIN M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the War Department, dated January 18, 1862, enclosing copy of a resolution of the House of Representatives, of January 15th, and asking me to furnish such views on the subject as will enable the Department to answer the call.

A severe domestic affliction, and numerous pressing engagements, have prevented an earlier compliance with the request, and I now avail myself of the first opportunity to give such views as suggest themselves to me.

The portions of the resolution which interest the road over which I preside, are those that relate to "a side track between Bristol and Chester, in Pennsylvania, through West Philadelphia; and also for the construction of a side track from Back River to the Relay House, in Maryland, through West Baltimore;" and "furthermore, that he be directed to invite propositions for the construction of a distinct and direct road from New York to Washington."

I presume that what is intended by the resolution, is to

ascertain which is the shortest and most expeditious route between New York and Washington, and on what terms such a route can be used for Government purposes, and I therefore proceed at once to give my views upon the subject.

First. It is not necessary to construct the whole of the route from Bristol to Chester, through West Philadelphia, as a considerable portion of the present road can be used without any change of route. The proper route for such a track is to leave the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad near or at Frankford, and thence pass through West Philadelphia to a point on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad near Gray's Ferry. This route would present much less of new road to be built than that indicated in the resolution, would be much less expensive, and could be constructed in a much shorter time. Nearly the whole of this route is now projected and authorized to be built by the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Means have also been provided to construct it, jointly, by the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. It is called the Junction Railroad, and will connect the three roads above mentioned, so that cars and engines can pass from one to the other without change; and as the Philadelphia and Reading, and Philadelphia and Trenton Railroads cross each other near Richmond, in the northerly part of the city of Philadelphia, a connection between these two roads can easily be made at the crossing aforesaid. This will secure a continuous and unbroken track between New York and Washington, which could be improved still further by leaving the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad at or near Frankford, and joining the Reading Rail-



road near the summit between Richmond and the Schuylkill River, as before indicated, if it were thought advisable to make the expenditure. The latter would be the most expeditious way of getting through the city of Philadelphia, and would doubtless best answer the purposes of the Government. There is another mode in which a continuous line will be provided and put in operation in a month or two at the farthest, and that is by a ferry-boat, sufficiently ample to take on deck a whole train of cars, running from Washington street wharf, in Philadelphia, to Camden, in New Jersey. This will be a very expeditious route for both freight and passengers, and can be put in operation in a shorter time by far than the other route referred to, as nearly all the preparations are already made, and the balance will be perfected as soon as possible.

The second branch of the inquiry which I propose to consider, relates to the route through West Baltimore, to connect the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad with the Washington Branch Railroad, at or near the Relay House.

Such a route would be a very costly one to build and operate, requiring extensive masonry, heavy cuts and fills, consuming much time in its construction, rendering necessary high grades, and thus enhancing the expense of operating and maintaining the route after its construction. A much better and more feasible route, in my opinion, would be by a ferry-boat from Canton to Locust Point, in Baltimore, so constructed as to transfer, on deck, from one point to the other, a whole train of cars at once. This route could be operated as expeditiously as the one proposed

through West Baltimore, and it could be built at not probably more than ten or twelve per cent. of the cost, and it would be available at all seasons of the year. With a view of obtaining the best information I could upon the subject, I addressed a note (marked A) to Benjamin H. Latrobe, Esq., a distinguished civil engineer of Baltimore, and append his answer for your information (marked B.)

The last branch of the inquiry relates to an independent and direct road between New York and Washington. In reference to this, I may say that the present route through Philadelphia and Baltimore, is the only direct route that is practicable. It varies but little from an air line, and that only where such variation is necessary to keep the road on fast land, and avoid running many miles in the waters of the Chesapeake. A straight line between these two cities would pass along and through the waters of this bay, from a point considerably east of the Susquehanna River, to a point west of Baltimore, a distance of more than forty miles, and would therefore be entirely impracticable. The nearest approach, therefore, to a straight line that can be attained, is the present route, passing through Philadelphia and Baltimore. Any route avoiding those cities would be longer than the present, and as it could obtain and would be obliged to rely upon a part only of the through business between New York and Washington, and as it could not accommodate the local and through business between Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, it would be very unproductive to its proprietors if they were individuals, still more so if they were the Government.

Obviously, the better way for all concerned would be to

perfect the present route, by making close and reliable connections at Philadelphia and Baltimore. And in order to avoid municipal restrictions, which are often annoying and vexatious to the public, while they redound to the benefit of no one, it would be well, in my estimation, for Congress to declare the entire route between New York and Washington a post route, to be operated by steam all the way, and that in the most expeditious manner known to modern engineering, consistent with safety, through the cities. The several companies should be thus vested with the authority to make the connections by steam, and should be required by the Government to make them. This would give the Government all the expedition they could desire, and thus aided by Congress, not with money, but only with authority to do what otherwise they might be unable to do. The present railroads could and would do all the business of the Government more economically and expeditiously than any new and independent road could do the same.

The rates now charged the Government for the transportation of freight and passengers between New York and Baltimore do not average two-thirds of those charged the public for the same services, and when it is recollected that the business of the public is constant and in both directions, while that of the Government is spasmodic and generally in one direction, requiring empty trains one way and a large surplus of cars at times, in order to be always ready, it will be seen that the rates charged the Government are liberal on the part of the railroad, and that no road could live and pay dividends on such rates if they had not other and more profitable business to rely upon.

The present business between New York and Washington is not a natural and permanent business. It is one that has grown up in consequence of the war, and is dependent upon the war for its present magnitude. Whenever the Government puts down the rebellion, and it is to be hoped it will succeed in doing this speedily, the business between New York and Washington will subside to its ordinary dimensions. Such a business is only adequate to the support of one line of railroad. If it were divided between two, it would furnish hardly enough to keep them both in good running order, thus sinking and rendering valueless the capital now invested in the present line, and ruining, pecuniarily, those who would be tempted to invest in the new and independent line.

I have presumed all along that the Government do not desire, and that it is not for its interest to embark in internal improvements unless a strong military necessity for the same exists. That none such exists, or can exist, between New York and Washington, is proven from the fact that the present line has always transported all the troops and supplies that the Government has required, without delay, and at less rates than an independent or Government road could have done. The present line has, since the war commenced, largely increased its means of transportation, is now ready, and will always hold itself ready, to transport all the Government may desire promptly, reasonably, and, if necessary, to the exclusion of its regular business.

In conclusion, I can only add that the railroad line which I represent has ever been ready to aid the Government with all the resources at its command in its hour of need,

and it now stands ready promptly to adopt any improvements calculated to facilitate the business of the Government and the country. It does not ask nor expect any pecuniary aid, but only suggests that Congress shall give such legislative aid as will enable it to make such connections, in and through the several cities, as the necessities of the case may require.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,

S. M. FELTON,

*President P., W. & B. R. R.*

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"A"

P., W. & B. R. R. OFFICE,

PHILADELPHIA, *February 7, 1862.*

BENJ. H. LATROBE, Esq., *Baltimore.*

DEAR SIR: Will you be good enough to give me your opinion, as an engineer, of the practicability of making a railroad connection between our road, at or near Back River, or any point between there and Canton, and the Washington Branch Railroad, through West Baltimore, striking the Washington Branch at the most feasible point between the city and the Relay House; and will you also, as an engineer, give me your opinion of the feasibility of a connection between Canton and Locust Point by a ferry-boat of sufficient size to take on a whole train of passenger or freight cars.

Please give me the foregoing information in writing as soon as you conveniently can.

Yours, truly,

S. M. FELTON, *Pres't.*

"B"

PITTSBURG, *February* 11, 1862.S. M. FELTON, Esq., *Philadelphia*.

DEAR SIR: Your note of the 7th instant has been forwarded to me from Baltimore, and I reply with pleasure to its inquiries respecting the practicable railroad connections between the Philadelphia & Baltimore and the Baltimore & Washington Railroads, in and around Baltimore.

Were I at home I could answer more in detail, for I should there have reports and maps at hand, but without their aid I can express decided opinions upon the subject.

*First.* As to routes *around* Baltimore, avoiding the improved parts of the city, so as to be able to run trains at speed by locomotive power. The best line for such a route would be obtained by leaving your present road at the "Orange Farm," about two miles east of your bridge over "Harris Creek," and then falling into the line of the Northern Central Railroad extension and pursuing that road to a point a little north of the Bolton Depot, where you would leave it and ascend a valley back of the Mount Hope Insane Asylum, which would lead along the northern boundary of the city to near its north-western corner, whence turning south along the western boundary you would reach the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at or near the Carrolton Viaduct and at the junction of the Locust Point branch of that road. Or, if a line entirely independent of the Northern Central Railroad location were desired, a more circuitous route would have to be pursued over ground to the east and north of that road from the point of departure from your present road to where you would cross the Northern Central

Railroad beyond the Bolton Depot, as above mentioned. This more circuitous route, carrying your line around the Baltimore Cemetery, and also the Greenmount Cemetery, would involve some strong grades and expensive excavations and embankments. Upon the shortest of these routes you would not avoid the construction of some eight or nine miles of road, as well as, without maps and measurements, I am able to judge—the existing route through this city between the same points being about six miles.

*Second.* As to a ferry to connect the Philadelphia Railroad, at Canton, with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, at Locust Point, using a steamboat of sufficient size to take over at once an entire train of passenger and freight cars. This alternative to the circuitous route of eight or nine miles around the city is, in my judgment, altogether feasible and possessed of superior commendations. No one is so well able to speak of the working of such a ferry as yourself, whose experience of long years at the Susquehanna has demonstrated its success. The harbor of Baltimore, with its slight variation in tide levels, its entire freedom from gorged or grounded ice, and its sheltered position from winds presents a much more favorable field for the operation of such a boat than Havre de Grace. The frequent passage upon her own track of a vessel of the required size and power would go far toward keeping the lower harbor free of ice, while in the intervals of her regular trips she might be employed as an ice-breaker for the port. A suitable boat, built with great strength and propelling power, but in other respects of the plainest finish, would not cost probably more than ten or twelve per cent. of the cost of the railway of eight or nine miles around the

city, which would be an expensive work in all respects, and especially damages to property.

By suitable arrangements at the wharves on the opposite sides of the harbor, the cars could be run on and off the boat with trifling loss of time, so as to enable the railroad companies to convey their passengers directly through the city on this route in a shorter time than by the route around the city over the high grades of that line. These are my *impressions* of the comparative advantages of the two modes of connecting the railways, and I regret that I have not within reach the means of making closer comparisons. I shall be glad if the views I have thus hastily thrown out should be of any service to you in your consideration of the question which may be before you. I expect to return to Baltimore in a week or two, and if you wish it I will look more carefully into the subject, with the data there at my disposal.

I am, dear sir, with much respect, yours,

BENJN H. LATROBE.

*Extract from letter of Benjamin H. Latrobe to S. M. Feltus,  
dated Baltimore, February 26, 1862.*

"In answer to your inquiries respecting the alternative modes of railway connections between your road and the Baltimore & Ohio Road, at Baltimore, I addressed you a letter from Pittsburg, on the 11th instant, which I hope you received. I returned here yesterday, and upon examining maps and other data in my possession, I find that I was not very much out of the way in my estimate of distances, grades, &c. The route around the city, leaving at



‘the ‘Orange Farm’ summit and falling into the Northern  
‘Central Railroad line, would be  $8\frac{3}{4}$  miles long, nearly, and  
‘require grades not less than 80 feet per mile. The route  
‘between the same points, viz: beginning two miles east of  
‘your Canton property and ending at the Carrolton Viaduct  
‘of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and near the Locust  
‘Point junction, would be  $7\frac{1}{4}$  miles, including the ferry across  
‘the harbor. Your steamboat, I think, should be long  
‘enough to let your whole train of passenger cars stand on  
‘the middle track. I came from Philadelphia yesterday,  
‘(was there too short a time to see you,) and for the first time  
‘crossed with the train on the boat. The operation was well  
‘performed, but owing to the division of the train took more  
‘time. Your boat is really a floating bridge, and I think  
‘the best you can ever have there.”

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#### RAILROAD FACILITIES BETWEEN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

The resolution of the House of Representatives of January 15th, called on the Secretary of War for information as to the means of establishing a speedy and direct route between New York and Washington.

The objects aimed at are speed and directness.

There will be no question that Congress may exercise its powers to attain these objects, for both military and postal purposes, to such an extent as it may deem necessary.

To this end it may aid existing routes by the grant of additional powers, or of money; or it may, as the resolution suggests, construct, as a government route, an entirely distinct route; or it may, either for a temporary exigency, or

permanently, take possession of existing roads, and the private property belonging to them, paying to the owners a fair and just compensation.

The well established policy of the Government, however, will forbid the exercise of any of these high and extreme powers, unless it be demanded by a necessity which justifies a departure from that policy.

Private enterprise has always proved to be the best promoter of public interests in all matters of a business character, and the interference of Government, as a general rule, has been only mischievous.

For a considerable period the Government did make appropriations of money to promote internal improvements; but that policy was long since, after great discussion, finally abandoned, and it has not been returned to in any degree, except by grants of public lands along railroad routes, where the purpose of Congress was to increase the value of its own remaining adjacent lands, and in such cases the grants were made to the States, and not to a corporation of private citizens.

So well settled is the principle that private enterprise is the best judge of what is demanded by the business interests of the community, that it may be safely inferred that where a railroad, or other similar work, is not established by this enterprise, it is neither wanted, nor will it be successful or profitable.

The aid, therefore, which the Government may be called on to lend to such a work, is only needed to give vitality to a concern which cannot sustain itself, and money loaned upon such security would, in all probability, prove to be

a permanent non-paying investment; and it would be a most dangerous precedent for Congress, at this day, to yield to a clamor for such kind of appropriations. There would be no limit to such calls.

Whatever may be necessary for the support and carrying on of Government, Congress should do. Everything else should be left to the unrestricted and unsupported competition of individuals and corporations.

The inquiry in this case, then, will be: 1st, Whether there exists such an exigency as that, for either postal or war purposes, it is necessary for Congress to exercise its powers upon the routes between New York and Washington? 2d, In what form and to what extent it shall be done?

The existing direct route through Philadelphia and Baltimore is as nearly an air-line as any road of such length can be built.

It passes through the great cities, and a populous region, affording business facilities to a larger population than any other road of equal length in the country.

The companies owning the route have been long established, and are known to have a financial ability equal to any demand.

The roads are thoroughly built, and are equipped with an amount of rolling stock adapted to the business greater than any other line in the country. They have been managed with skill, and a due regard for the safety of persons and property. No other route has a record more free from accidents, in proportion to numbers.

They have, it is true, some serious difficulties to surmount in the privileges, which are withheld from them by municipi-

pal regulations, in making these connections, in passing through the cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore. These difficulties the companies have long and earnestly sought to have removed; but the want of sufficient power, from the States creating the corporations, has hitherto made their efforts unsuccessful, although many improvements have been accomplished for increasing the public accommodation.

With the exception of the time lost in the transmission of passengers and freight through these cities, the rate of speed upon the whole line has been equal to that of the first-class roads in all parts of the country.

Congress alone has the power to enable the companies to overcome those difficulties; and if it be necessary for the military or postal purposes of the Government to obtain a greater rate of speed, Congress can now, without the appropriation of a single dollar of public money, accomplish that end.

The report of the Committee on Roads and Canals, which accompanies a proposed bill for the loan of the Government credit to a corporation of citizens, known as the Reading and Columbia Railroad, has attempted to show that the present facilities for transportation of passengers, freight, and mails between New York and Washington, are not equal to the necessities of the Government; and the bill proposed is put forward as a measure adapted to supply the deficiencies.

That increased facilities might be advantageously employed is freely admitted, and if the Government will give the authority, which alone is needed to enable the existing companies on the direct line to overcome the obstacles which cause the delays in Philadelphia and Baltimore, the evils complained of will be at once removed.

But it is not easy to see how the grant of Government money, or bonds, to the Reading and Columbia corporation can tend toward the accomplishment of the purposes desired; namely, increased speed by a direct route.

In the first place, it will be seen that this corporation has been in existence since May 19, 1857. Its charter required that "the company should commence said road within two years and complete it within ten years from the passage of the act." On April 15, 1858, it was compelled to ask for another act, extending the time for commencing and completing to five years from the expiration of the time previously designated; so that it is under no obligation to complete it till May, 1872. It is most sincerely to be hoped that by that time the military exigency, which is said now to demand greater facilities for transportation, may have passed away.

Nor can it hardly escape observation that a corporation, which has suffered its right to construct a road of so little length to lay so long dormant, can not be supposed to have a very strong confidence in the value or success of the enterprise.

In the next place, instead of furnishing a more direct route, the one proposed *via* Reading and Columbia is fifty-seven miles longer than the existing one through Philadelphia and Baltimore!

And, thirdly, as to the rate of speed which can be properly used, the high grades which the report of the engineer of the Reading and Columbia company shows to be unavoidable on that route, makes it wholly impossible to equal that of the direct route.

The grade ascending South mountain is 66 feet per mile, and the descent 52.8. The slopes of Ephrata mountain require 70 feet, and both the ascending and descending grade of Chiques' ridge require 90 feet per mile.

In extraordinary contrast with this exhibiture, it may be stated that on the direct route between New York and Baltimore, there is only one grade exceeding 30 feet per mile for any considerable distance, while generally the grades are much less than that.

The facts and figures showing these mountain grades on the Reading and Columbia line, are taken from Mr. Lyon's (the engineer) report, pages 17 and 18. But they seem wholly to have escaped the research of the members of the committee who have recommended the bill, and have instituted a comparison between the two routes. If they had investigated the subject carefully enough for this purpose, their route, instead of being called *inland*, would have been designated as the "mountainous" route. The same gentlemen, in their report, make it a ground of complaint that the direct route is subjected to "*a special tax imposed by the States of New Jersey and Delaware*;" but they also failed to look into the Pennsylvania charter of this Reading and Columbia company, where they would have found the following section, by which Pennsylvania also reserves the right to impose a tax:

"SECTION 7. That the Legislature hereby reserves the right, at any time, to impose such tax on tonnage passing over said road, as they may deem necessary to protect the public interests."

The suggestion that in time of insurrection or war the

direct route may be interrupted by the destruction of its bridges, requires but a moment's consideration. It is true that every railroad is liable to this trouble, whether it results from accident or malicious intention. The bridges of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore road, on the direct route, were burnt by traitorous persons in the spring of 1861 ; but it will not be overlooked that these bridges crossed shallow streams, and were capable of easy and early reconstruction, and through the determination of that corporation they were at once repaired, and made eminently useful to the Government. The interior route *via* Harrisburg had its bridges destroyed at the same time of those on the direct route. The direct route used that part of its road that was uninjured between Philadelphia and Perryville, and from thence opened the Annapolis route and thus transported troops and supplies every day ; while the interior route was entirely disabled from April 20th to May 15th, and troops sent that way were obliged to return to Harrisburg and thence go to Washington *via* Perryville and Annapolis. From this we may infer what would be the condition of things if such a bridge as that across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, should, either by accident or malice, be destroyed. It is not now capable of transporting a train drawn by locomotives, and cannot be made so at a less cost than \$200,000. It is a mile and an eighth long, and traverses a chasm at a considerable height above the river. Surely no such danger surrounds any bridge on the direct route.

But if the Government do, indeed, need an inland route, either as an alternative resource in time of war, or for the purpose of competition in business in ordinary times, it has one

already at hand, in the route which has been so freely used by it, *via* Harrisburg, during the past season, for transportation of both troops and munitions. It is, to be sure, a few miles longer than the proposed experiment by Reading and Columbia; but every practical railroad man will say, at once, that by its easier grades and more favorable curves, more speedy transit can be secured than by the mountain route proposed in the bill recommended by the committee.

The gentlemen who made the report recommending Congress to lend government money for the construction of the new mountain route, were not content with extolling the superior and fascinating elements, which promise to render it a mine of wealth to the stockholders, as well as a most important aid to the Government; but they went further, and impeached the fidelity, as well as ability of the companies on the direct route, by charges against them of extortion in performing the services which are due, not only from individual citizens, but from every corporation enjoying the protection which the Government gives. For the purpose of vindicating one of these companies—namely, the P., W. & B. R. R.—from any such imputation, and for this purpose alone, it is deemed proper to present for the consideration of Congress, and the people, the annexed documents which belong to the history of the perils into which the Government was precipitated at the outbreak of the rebellion, in the spring and summer of 1861. These documents are but a few out of the many which might be produced; but they will serve to repel any injurious imputations which interested parties may see fit to make.



*Papers relating to Transportation of Troops and Supplies,  
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"A."

APRIL 21, 1861.

DEAR SIR: You will receive another letter from me with this. We shall need supplies to a very large amount sent here from New York, since the interruption to purchases in Baltimore. They will, I think, much of them, have to come *via Euston, Reading, Harrisburg, and the rest by sea, via Annapolis*. I have called on Thomas A. Scott to take charge of the Railroads, and I want you to assist the Commissaries and Quartermasters in pushing forward their supplies, as well as in aiding them in making purchases at or from New York.

We need men here without delay, and supplies should accompany them if possible.

SIMON CAMERON.

A CUMMINGS.

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 No. 1.

Plan for the Transportation of Troops and Supplies to Washington, presented by S. M. Felton, and approved by Gen's Patterson and Cadwalader, and Messrs. J. Edgar Thompson and Edward S. Sanford, April 21, 1861: the day succeeding the opening of the Annapolis Route.

*First.* The Pennsylvania Central, the Camden & Amboy, and the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroads, the Adams Express, and the Telegraph, shall be consolidated to act as a unit.

*Second.* The Railroad from Philadelphia to Havre de Grace should be garrisoned, and martial law enforced along the line; also, along the route to Annapolis *via* the Susquehanna river.

*Third.* Batteries, commanding the Susquehanna, should be established at Cecil and Havre de Grace respectively.

*Fourth.* All available steam vessels and other craft, excepting those required for the immediate transportation of troops from Philadelphia to Annapolis, should be concentrated at Cecil or Perryville, the railroad terminus at the Susquehanna.

*Fifth.* The Garrison at Fort McHenry should prevent any steam vessels or other craft of a hostile character from leaving Baltimore.

*Sixth.* The Government should forthwith take military possession of the railway line from Washington to Annapolis.

*Seventh.* When sufficient troops and supplies shall be concentrated at Washington, by means of the Annapolis route, the Government should take possession of the entire Washington Branch of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and the railway line from Baltimore to Havre de Grace, and thereby secure a safe and speedy means of communication with Washington.

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*Telegrams relating to the foregoing Plan:*

TO J. EDGAR THOMPSON: As the Telegraph and Railroads are interrupted so that we cannot communicate immediately with the War Department, shall we not act upon the plan proposed to transport troops, &c., until we can hear from the Department.

S. M. FELTON.

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TO S. M. FELTON: Gen. Patterson approves the plan, and we can act upon it without further authority.

J. E. THOMPSON.

## No. 2.

*Despatch from S. M. Felton, dated Broad and Prime streets,  
Philadelphia, April 23, 1861.*

To Gov. Andrew, Boston; Gov. Morgan, New York; Gov. Sprague, Rhode Island; Gov. Washburn, Maine; Gov. Buckingham, Connecticut; Gov. Goodwin, New Hampshire:

The New York and Massachusetts Regiments are at Annapolis, but have not yet landed, in consequence of the resistance of the secessionists, who have possession of the place. The regiments are preparing to land under the protection of the guns of the Frigate "Constitution." All available troops and armed vessels should forthwith be despatched to their assistance and relief. It is imperatively necessary that the troops should be well armed and supplied with abundant ammunition and carry rations and provisions for an emergency.

Above not on any account to be put into newspapers. No name to be used as authority.

S. M. FELTON,

*President P., W. & B. Railroad.*

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## No. 3.

ANNAPOLIS, April 26, 1861.

DEAR SIR: We are in want of a quantity of coal for fuel, also, a small lot for gas. The cars, &c., on this road are very poor indeed. The two engines are very ordinary, but in working order. I send you a report by my Colonel, who

seized the property, so that you can judge for yourself what our needs are.

We do not care for the first class passenger car, but could do with them.

Yours,

B. F. BUTLER.

S. M. FELTON.

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No. 4.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 25, 1861.*

S. M. FELTON, Esq.,

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 24th instant is received, and I hasten to express my thanks for your energetic, patriotic, and prompt conduct, in connection with Messrs. Thompson and Sanford, in pushing forward men and supplies for the defense of the Capital. Let me assure you that this Department has the highest appreciation of your meritorious conduct, and that the Government will assume, fully, the pecuniary responsibility which you may have incurred.

Very respectfully,

SIMON CAMERON,

*Secretary of War.*

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No. 5.

DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS, *April 30, 1861.*

DEAR SIR: I am annoyed to death with continual calls for passage. To check it, I have established a tariff of \$4 (four dollars) from Washington to Perryville, except those upon official business, and hope the number will be limited by the Department, as the number now interferes with the

transportation of troops. Will you allow me to suggest that we are getting yeoman service from S. M. Felton, Esq., President of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad? Will you not, by an order, put the whole matter of transportation by this line under his direction, subject to my order for military purposes? Mr. Felton took the responsibility to give me the sole charge of the "Maryland" steamer, by means of which alone a landing could be effected. He is as efficient and true as steel. I am constructing a short piece of railroad for the connection of tide-water with Washington. I have most of the material now, and trust to be able to have it in order in ten days.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

BNJ. F. BUTLER,

*Brig. Gen'l. Commanding.*

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

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No. 6.

HEAD-QUARTERS, PENN'A MILITIA,

HARRISBURG, *May 27, 1861.*

To S. M. FELTON, Esq.,

*Pres't P., W. & B. R. R. Co.*

SIR: Will you send a representative of your road to meet like representatives from other railroads in the State, on Tuesday next, June 4th, at 3 o'clock p. m., in the Chamber of the House of Representatives, to fix upon prices for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, to arrange for the more speedy settling of accounts, and to facilitate the operations of the State in this important crisis?

By order of the Commander-in-Chief.

JOHN A. WRIGHT, *Aid-de-Camp.*

No. 7.

PHILA., WILMINGTON &amp; BALTIMORE R. R. Co.,

PHILADELPHIA, *June 3, 1861.*

SIR: Having been absent some days, I have just received yours of the 20th ult., requesting that this road may be represented at a meeting to be held at Harrisburg to-morrow. We have already, however, arranged with the War Department for "prices for transportation of troops and munitions," on account of the United States, and cannot well fix any different rates for transportation ordered by the Commonwealth. We propose to charge for troops, in numbers of fifty or more, at one time, at the rate of two dollars each between Philadelphia and Baltimore (or two-thirds of full fare.) Sick, wounded, or discharged soldiers, presenting an order from the Department for passage as such, will be carried at the above rates, even in small parties or singly, from Baltimore northward. Freight for the United States, between Philadelphia and Baltimore and any stations, we charge our regular local rates; between Philadelphia or New York and Washington, a rate giving us about two-thirds of local rates on an average of the different classes of freight. We shall be happy to carry out any arrangement looking to the more speedy settlement of accounts, or for facilitating the operations of the State in any way.

S. M. FELTON,

*Pres't P., W. & B. R. R. Co.*

Per E. Q. SEWALL, Jr.

His Excellency A. G. CURTIN,

*Harrisburg.*

[*From Philadelphia Inquirer of June 7th, 1861.*]

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#### IMPORTANT MEETING OF RAILROAD OFFICERS.

At a meeting of officers of the several railroads of the State, called by the Governor of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg, and held in the hall of the House of Representatives, on Tuesday, the 4th of June, the following roads were represented, viz:

Cumberland Valley Railroad, by Judge Watts, President.  
 Schuylkill and Susquehanna, by Mr. Tracy, Superintendent.  
 Pennsylvania Railroad, by Enoch Lewis, Superintendent.  
 Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, by G. A. Nichols, Superintendent.  
 Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad, by G. C. Hathaway, Ag't.  
 D., S. and Western Railroad, by John Brisbrin, Superintendent.  
 Belvidere and Delaware Railroad, by Mr. Welsh, Eng'r and Sup't.  
 Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad, by V. L. Bradford, President.  
 L. and Blooms Railroad, by Mr. Isley, Superintendent.  
 Philadelphia and Erie Railroad, by E. F. Gay, Vice-President.  
 Northern Pennsylvania Railroad, by A. Roberts, Eng'r and Sup't.  
 Northern Central Railroad, by Mr. Clark, Superintendent.  
 Hanover Branch Railroad, by Mr. Githberger, Superintendent.  
 Lake Shore Railroad, by Mr. Nottingham, Superintendent.  
 Gettysburg Railroad, by Mr. Willis, Secretary.  
 Lehigh Valley Railroad, by Mr. Sayres, Superintendent.  
 West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad, by Mr. Hickman, President.  
 Norristown and Germantown Railroad, by H. K. Smith, Superintendent.  
 East Pennsylvania Railroad, by E. C. Clymer, President.  
 Elmhurst and Williamsport Railroad, by Thomas Kimber, President.  
 Catawissa Railroad, by T. Haskins DuPuy, President.

Mr. John A. Wright, aid to the Governor, in the chair, called the meeting to order, when Mr. DuPuy, of the Catawissa road, was appointed Secretary.

The question propounded by the chairman: "Is there any provision in the charter of your company making special rates of fare and freight for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, whenever called upon, for the purpose of



suppressing insurrections or repelling invasion?" The general opinion expressed was, with but few exceptions, that there was not.

The following resolution was then offered by Judge Watts, viz :

*Resolved*, That the settlements of all accounts for transportation and freight upon the railroads of Pennsylvania, to be settled with the State, the charges should be at a reduction of  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. for transporting passengers; and that for freight the charges shall be according to their respective tariff of rates.

*Provided*, That no company be required to reduce their charges for passengers below two cents per mile.

The vote on this resolution being as follows, viz :

*Yeas*—Messrs. Watts, Tracy, Nichols, Hathaway, Bradford, Roberts, Githberger, Willis, Nottingham, Sayers, Clymer—11.

*Nays*—Messrs. Lewis, Brisbin, Isley, Gay, Clark, Hickman, Smith, and Kimber—8.

Messrs. Welsh and DuPuy not voting.

The resolution was announced as carried, and sent to the Governor for approval. (The chairman read to the meeting General Order No. 2 of Maj. Gen. McCall.)

\* \* \* \* \*

On motion of Mr. Nichols the vote on the resolution presented by Judge Watts was reconsidered—yeas 15, nays 5.

On motion of Mr. Willis the proviso in Judge Watts' resolution, as previously presented, was stricken out—yeas 9, nays 7. The resolution, as amended, then read as follows ;

*Resolved*, That the settlement of all accounts for freight and transportation upon the railroads of Pennsylvania, to be

settled with the State, the charges should be at a reduction of  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. on their local freight for transporting passengers, and that for freight the charges shall be according to their respective tariff of rates, which was passed—yeas 11, nays 7.

On motion of Mr. Smith, who voted in the negative, it was resolved, that the vote be considered unanimous in the affirmative—carried.

Mr. Clymer presented a resolution that the railroads here represented carry the wives of soldiers visiting their husbands in camps free of charge, which was declared out of order.

Mr. Gay presented the following resolve:

That receiving roads shall get an order from the State, settle with the other roads, and make arrangements with other roads for transportation: which was afterwards withdrawn, as the resolution of Judge Watts, already adopted, was deemed sufficient.

On motion of Mr. Gay, the meeting adjourned *sine die*.

J. HASKINS DUPUY, *Sec'y*.

HARRISBURG, *June* 4, 1861.

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No. 9.

[*From Philadelphia Inquirer of June 19, 1861.*]

(1) LARGE PREPARATIONS FOR CARRYING TROOPS—FIFTY CAR LOADS A DAY FROM NEW YORK—SPECIAL DESPATCH FROM HARRISBURG.

*June* 18, 1861.—Arrangements have been made to-day, by which the New York and New England troops will be carried through to Baltimore over the Lebanon Valley and

Northern Central Railroad at the rate of twenty-five car-loads per day. The same number will go over the Camden & Amboy and Philadelphia & Wilmington Railroads.—Twenty-five car-loads is said to be the utmost capacity of the Philadelphia route.

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[*From Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 1861.*]

(2) *Answer.*

P., W. & B. R. R. Co., THURLOW, *June 20, 1861.*

EDITORS OF PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER:

I see by your paper of this morning that you give the capacity of our road for carrying troops at twenty-five car-loads per day. We have never yet been put to our highest capacity by the Government, and have carried ninety car-loads per day. We can take one hundred car-loads every twelve hours, or two hundred car-loads per day, if desirable or necessary to send that number.

S. M. FELTON,

*Pres't P., W. & B. R. R.*

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[*From Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 1861.*]

THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS.

OFFICE CAMDEN & AMBOY R. R. & T. Co.,

(3) PHILADELPHIA, *June 19, 1861.*

EDITORS PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER:

The Harrisburg despatch in the *Inquirer* of this morning is calculated to do us and the city of Philadelphia great injustice. Troops taking the route *via* Lebanon Valley Road

are subject to the fatigue of traveling eighty miles farther to reach Baltimore or Washington than by the route *via* Philadelphia. It is an error in saying that our capacity is limited to twenty-five cars. Our capacity is not less than three times that number of first-class cars, and, if we use second-class also, will greatly exceed that number, and, if required, could start from New York four or five regiments at a time. To-day, I understand two regiments were started from New York *via* Philadelphia, at 3 p. m., and another will start at 5 p. m.

Yours, truly,

W. H. GATZMER.

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No. 10.

FLAGSHIP WABASH,

PORT ROYAL, *January* 25, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I received some time since your favor of 26th December, and owe you an apology for not sooner acknowledging it. I trust, however, that what I have to say in reply, if of any moment, may still be in time. You state, "as you know a good deal of what we did for the Government in opening the Annapolis route, and furnishing and forwarding supplies, will you please give me your recollections, as much in detail as your numerous engagements will allow, so that I may use the statement before the committee. I only desire that we shall be placed before Congress in such a position as the facts will justify."

It is not only my duty to reply fully to the inquiry, but I am pleased at the opportunity of bearing my testimony to the patriotic zeal and energy which governed the Philadel-

phia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company, under your presidency, during one of the darkest hours of our national struggle, when Baltimore had risen and Washington was in peril.

My official station at that time, as commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, brought me much in relation with you, thus affording me the opportunity of acquiring personal knowledge of your operations. As to the opening of the Annapolis route, it was entirely of your own planning, and I remember all the circumstances which led to it.

I had returned late at night from a day of arduous labor at the Navy Yard, in despatching the "Keystone State" to help save the vessels of war at Norfolk, to the La Pierre House, where I met you, when you asked me to accompany you to see General Butler, who had arrived in the evening with the Massachusetts 8th Regiment.

On seeing the General, you informed him that you had received a telegram from Governor Hicks, requesting you to send no more troops through Baltimore. General Butler promptly replied, "if Colonel Lefferts (the New York 7th had also arrived in Philadelphia) will join me, we will fight our way through." You then told the General that you expected to hear at any moment that the bridges had been burned, (which did occur,) and that you had come to propose forwarding him and his regiment by way of Annapolis, employing the Company's large ferry-boat for that purpose. You then mentioned the object you had in asking me to accompany you, that I might give General Butler accurate information as to his landing at Annapolis, adding that you

had intelligence from Washington, from reliable sources, which represented the Capital in a most defenseless condition.

On this basis the arrangements were made. I explained to General Butler that he could land at the Naval Academy grounds under cover of the frigate *Constitution*, and at your request sent a battery, under Lieut. Watmough, to Perryville to cover the embarkation at that point, with guns and seamen, under Commander Steelman and Lieut. Crosby, to arm the *Maryland*, at the same time despatching the Philadelphia ice-boat, with a heavy battery, under Commander Glissen, to Annapolis.

At this time all intercourse with Washington was cut off by telegraph and railroad, and it was the deep impression made on my mind of the importance of securing the Annapolis route, as suggested by you, that caused me to give you all the assistance in my power.

I think it well to add to the above statement, that the first despatches of the disaster at "Bull Run" were received by you, or passed through your office, and that you sent for me at the Navy Yard, to ask my opinion whether you should not get ready to organize the Annapolis route a second time, to forward reinforcements in case Baltimore should rise again.

In short, I have never seen more energy and zeal in a public officer than marked your whole conduct, and that of the agents employed under you, during the dark hours I have alluded to, and it gives me pleasure to say so.

I am, dear sir, yours, very truly,

S. F. DuPONT, U.S.N.

S. M. FELTON, Esq.,

*Pres't P., W. & B. R. R. Co.*

## No. 11.

*Statement by Nicholas P. Trist, Paymaster of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company.*

In December of last year, (1860,) at the desire of Mr. Felton, President of this Company, I followed him into his office, that he might converse with me upon a subject which he there unfolded in detail. In view of the events then looming up, and of the probability of a state of things in Baltimore which might render it impossible or unadvisable to send, through that city, troops for the protection of Washington, it had occurred to him that down the Delaware railroad to Seaford, and thence by steamer up the Potomac, would be an eligible route. Our conversation resulted in a modification of this plan, suggested by the probability that the seizure of Fort Washington would be among the earliest measures of the conspirators; or, if that should not have taken place, batteries lower down on the Potomac would render the passage of vessels up the river perilous, if not impracticable. The modification consisted in the adoption of Annapolis, or some neighboring point on the Maryland shore, as the place to which troops should be conveyed from Seaford.

On that occasion, Mr. Felton evinced the strongest solicitude in regard to the safety of the nation's capital, and the inauguration of the President elect; and the determination that all means under his control, so far as these could be made available towards the object, should be used with all possible energy. "The time has come," said he, "when there must be but two parties recognized in the country—Union men and disunion men."

The result of this conversation, together with a map and some memoranda, was immediately communicated by me to Gen'l Scott, who had then recently gone to Washington, and whom I saw there a few days afterwards, having made the journey at Mr. Felton's request, to impart to the General, orally, information in regard to the organization and designs of the conspirators in Maryland and other border States, which the former had obtained from sources known to him to be reliable, with which he was in constant communication. In this respect, as I became more and more fully aware, with the progress of the crisis, he possessed very rare advantages, resulting from the position he held and the relation of mutual confidence and friendship which, in the course of his professional career, had grown up between himself and a large number of the right sort of men. And of those advantages he made the most.

Passing over the intervening period, (which elicited numerous manifestations of the determination expressed by Mr. F. on the occasion just stated, and of a corresponding spirit in the employes of the road, one and all,) I come to the time of its severest test, when such manifestations were called forth hourly, by day and by night, for many weeks in succession.

On the 13th of April, I again went to Washington at Mr. F.'s request; the object of this journey also being to impart information to Gen'l Scott, and especially to make known to him the impending destruction of our bridges. Thus far, the means employed by Mr. F. to prevent this had proved effectual; but now the resources at his command had become totally inadequate, and their destruction was inevitable, un-



less prevented by aid from the Government, The General was fully aware of this, and told me in confidence that a considerable force—six thousand men was, I think, the number—was at the earliest possible moment, to be posted along the road between Wilmington and Baltimore.

On the 18th I got back to Philadelphia, where I found Mr. Felton awaiting me on the platform. In his office was Mr. Thompson, President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who had been commissioned by the Secretary of War to concert measures with Mr. F. for the transportation of troops. That day was an exceedingly busy one; its chief event being the arrival and expediting of the Massachusetts Sixth, on its way to the murderous assault which had been prepared for its reception by the conspirators in Baltimore, as the means whereby the game of “precipitation” should be made successful in their State. As the midnight train was about to start, an officer of the New York Seventh presented himself, en route to Washington, and bringing the assurance that his regiment would leave in the afternoon of the next day, and the few words of conversation, for which there was time, between Mr. F. and himself, resulted in his telegraphing to Col. Lefferts to expedite his departure from New York as much earlier as the hour intended, as might be practicable, and in Mr. F.’s writing to Col. L. to the same effect.

On the day following, (the ever memorable 19th of April,) the telegraph brought us intelligence of the assault upon the Massachusetts “invaders,” and kept us apprised of the course of events there. This caused Mr. F. to revert to that December plan, so far as regarded landing at Annapolis; and late in the afternoon it was definitively settled between Mr. Thomp-

son and himself, with reference to the troops expected here that night, (the Massachusetts 8th, under Gen'l Butler, and the New York 7th,) that they should be hurried down this road as far as Perryville, and thence, by the steamer *Maryland*, (the Company's great ferry-boat,) to Annapolis. This plan was forthwith submitted to the military authorities for their sanction: and having been approved at a conference which took place at Gen'l Patterson's—present himself, Gov. Curtin, Gen'l Cadwalader, and Mayor Henry—measures were at once entered upon to carry it out. Among these were arrangements for despatching a number of propellers through the Delaware & Chesapeake Canal, to Perryville, to take the place of the steamer *Maryland* as ferry-boat, and for general purposes.

All being thus settled, I again set out for Washington by the midnight train: this being judged by Mr. F. and myself advisable, in order to insure Gen'l Scott's becoming informed of these arrangements, agreeably to which the two regiments above named were to reach Perryville in time to embark there about four o'clock in the morning, and land at Annapolis about seven hours afterwards; that is, before mid-day on the 20th. As the train was about to start, Mr. Felton left me to see Gen'l Butler, who had arrived with his regiment some hours previously, during the conference at Gen'l Patterson's.

As our train entered Baltimore, the railroad bridge at Canton was seen to be in flames; and soon afterwards the train was stopped and surrounded by a body of police and military, under the command of Major Trimble, who, as I was informed by our conductor, seized it in the name of the

Governor of the State and the Mayor of the city. Taking the engine and such of the cars as he required, and impressing into his service the men who had charge of the train, he proceeded up the road, leaving the rest where it had been stopped. The stoppage caused us to miss the connection; in consequence of which I was retarded a few hours in reaching Washington, where the intelligence from Philadelphia proved most acceptable.

On my return here, on the night of the 25th, I found "the Annapolis route" in full operation, and giving full employment to every man in the Company's service. Not one, from the President down, but whose energies were tasked to the utmost in their respective spheres of work and of responsibility. With all, the paramount motive, the all-engrossing thought, the feeling which mastered every other feeling, was one and the same—*the Government must be maintained*. The President of the Company, by his words and by his example, had filled every man under him with this spirit. Every one of them felt, as well as knew, that the road was now the Government's road, that the paramount rule of conduct for all was, that Government business must take precedence of all other business, of whatever nature it might be, and that it must be despatched with all possible energy and all possible alacrity. When found to interfere with this, all regulations, however peremptory they might be, were overridden.

Throughout the crisis, that sense of his obligations towards the Company, with whose property and whose interests he is entrusted, by which the President is habitually governed, was, I felt sure, entirely subordinate to the desire to make the road useful to the Government. This, I had no doubt,

was at all moments, the uppermost thought in his mind. So soon as the state of things in that quarter had become such as to admit of this, the work of re-building the burnt bridges was entered upon, and was pushed with the utmost vigor. At this period, I learned that so soon as the line to Baltimore should be re-established, the fare for troops was to be reduced to two-thirds of the usual rate: the President observing that whilst the road was only receiving the fare to Perryville, when its whole force was devoted to the service of the Government, the expenses being about the same that they would have been had the line been open to Baltimore, such reduction was not reconcilable with justice towards those with whose interests he was entrusted.

N. P. TRIST.

PHILADELPHIA, *December* 18, 1861.







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